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Abstract 
Providing affordable access to appropriate financial services for the low-income population has been an on-
going challenge for most developing nations, Zambia included. On this premise, this paper seeks to empirically 
investigate and quantify costs to clients in accessing financial services in the rural areas of Zambia, based on 
cross-sectional primary data collected in the Chongwe district from 236 households, documentation and key 
informant interviews. This study used the Probit and Heckman selection models to analyse cost to the client 
factors affecting the likelihood of accessing financial services (credit) by rural households in Zambia. Results 
revealed that households’ costs incurred by clients in accessing financial services are not limited to financial 
costs such interest, fees, transport and savings, etc., but equally other hidden costs such regulatory and 
compliance costs, economic costs, psychological costs, and social and cultural costs. The study recommends that 
policy formulation in the areas of financial inclusion, rural and agricultural finance should be based on reducing 
cost-to-client attributes such as the regulatory and compliance costs, economic costs and psychological costs 
identified above. 
Keywords: costs to client, financial services, access to finance, Heckman two-stage model.  
 
1. Introduction  
Access to financial services that meet rural needs is vital to economic development in low-income developing 
states such as Zambia. The rural poor cannot hope to lift themselves out of poverty if their access to finance is 
deemed expensive. Financial markets in developing countries and particularly the sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
region, including Zambia, are largely underdeveloped, lack depth and are highly inefficient. According to 
Morduch (1995), rural financial and insurance markets in the rural areas are generally non-existent, and of those 
that do, many work imperfectly. Despite this the importance of financial markets which suit and meet the unique 
requirements of the rural population cannot be over-emphasised owing to rural economies’ dependence on 
agricultural production. The importance of rural financial services can be best understood by examining their 
potential contribution to the development of the enterprises and agricultural sector (CSO, 2010). Despite rural 
financial products being largely designed and implemented with rural households as the core intended clients, 
most of these products have been labelled as inappropriate and expensive. Well-designed products are needed 
that enable rural financial clients to adequately borrow, save, and be able to insure against any risk as they 
expand their set of economic activities (Diagne, 2001). A notable number of prominent rural financial 
programmes such as rural credit, savings and insurance, do not take into account some of the key socio-
economic and environmental attributes of the rural financial market that have a bearing on the cost of accessing 
financial services. Despite various intervention measures to address the high direct costs associated with access 
to finance, which include lowering interest rates and bank fees, transport costs and other associated transaction 
costs, generally clients’ costs to access financial services remain high. However, Coetzee (2010) argues that to 
effectively address this cost problem, there is a need to understand how it is constituted. As hypothesised, in 
addition to the known direct costs mentioned above, there are other hidden costs that determine the overall cost 
to the client in accessing financial services, which may have a profound effect on the client. These include 
psychological costs, economic costs and regulatory and compliance costs. This paper seeks to empirically 
investigate and identify the overall costs to clients in accessing financial services in the rural areas of Zambia. 
The paper concerns itself with the literature on policy and development in the rural finance markets, seeking to 
tackle the constraints of the cost to client for financial services in rural Zambia  
 
1.1 Objective of the Study 
The main objective is to investigate determinants that affect the overall cost to the client in accessing rural 
financial services in Zambia. Data used in the study comprised both primary and secondary data. The specific 
objectives were: 
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· To identify the factors influencing costs to the client in accessing rural financial services in Zambia 
· To investigate the extent to which these identified factors influence costs to the client in accessing rural 
financial services in Zambia 
· To propose appropriate policy for rural financial markets based on the results of the cost-to-client 
analysis 
1.1.2  Factors likely to affect  Cost to Client  
According to Egwuatu (2008) access to financial services contributes to poverty reduction and overall 
development of rural economy by enhancing income generating investment activities. However, financial access 
is limited in most rural areas in third world countries due to high transaction costs, poor infrastructure, and price 
risks in agriculture, among others. There are various factors hypothesised to hinder access to finance; these 
include gender, collateral, age, geographical location and financial literacy, as well as interest rates and 
transaction costs (Zeller, 1994). However, the most common factor known to affect access is overall cost-to-
client, though very little is known about it. This section therefore serves as a guide to the key concepts and 
knowledge on cost-to-client accessibility of finance. The next two sections discuss cost related literature, which 
includes a summary of variables likely to affect costs to the client and, finally, a theoretical framework. This will 
help the study create an understanding of cost to client in relation to access to finance. The next section is meant 
to discuss elements that are fundamental in coming up with the theory of cost-to-client factors. Social networks 
are known to play an important role in smoothing consumption risk, particularly in third world countries where 
there are limited formal contracts and poorly developed financial markets. In financial industrial credit 
economies, households usually obtain credit against individual guarantees, whereas from mainstream 
commercial sources the decisions on loan disbursements to clients are based on the available information on 
borrowers’ credit risk. In most third world countries, however, the low income poor households means they 
usually do not have access to the guarantees and collateral mechanisms mentioned above. This scenario is further 
worsened by lack of vital information on potential borrowers’ creditworthiness (Getz, C, 2012). This situation of 
lack of vital information on potential borrowers and tangible collateral base increases their cost to access credit 
services. However, certain types of financial service providers design their institutional arrangements to offer 
these low-income or poor borrowers valid substitutes for individual collateral and low-cost alternatives to 
imperfect creditworthiness information. Social collateral measure prototypes used by financial service providers 
are borrowers’ reputation, membership of social networks, and location of traditional financial or physical 
collateral (Bastelaer, 2000). According to Sodano et al (2008), it is fundamentally important to understand how 
cultural factors such social norms, legal rights and women’s access to and control over resources shape and 
define their ability to access credit facilities, as this has an impact on the cost of accessing financial services. 
According the World Bank (2008), though women have control over their families’ livestock, this varies across 
cultures as they still lack responsibility for their purchase and sale, leaving them with virtually no tangible 
collateral base. Hence this negatively affects their ability to access credit facilities because costs go up. 
Furthermore, other social factors that are important are literacy levels and psychological stress associated with 
accessing financial services. According to the UNDP (2007), even in special cases where rural inhabitants have 
access to market opportunities and information on financial services, they lack capacity to comprehensively 
understand and process it. Their low literacy levels and lack of exposure to the official languages used by 
financial service providers hamper their ability to benefit directly from information that is provided in written 
form. Brown (2001) stresses that this language barrier leads to these rural clients failing to fully understand the 
conditions of complex financial products offered to them, thereby leading to costs of access by client being 
expensive. According to Field et al. (2012), one of the growing causes of health problems in recent times is 
financial stress. As well documented in literature, it is one of the important factors that lead to mental health 
problems as it turns out to be among the causes of morbidity in developing countries. One major concern of 
financial stress is that the psychological burden of frequent repayment of loans lies mainly among the low 
income or poor clients who often lack appropriate financial tools to optimally understand and manage loans. This 
disability usually offsets the positive influence of access to credit by making borrowers psychologically worse 
off. Another factor that has a profound effect on cost is legal regulatory requirements such as customer 
identification and residential verification conducted by financial service providers. To comply with these 
requirements, clients incur costs such as time spent, document acquisition and costs of interpreting complex rules 
(Bester et al., 2004).Economic costs associated with accessing financial services are incurred as early as credit 
application process. For instance, in a scenario where a client attempts to obtain credit from a bank or MFI, they 
incur hidden costs such as opportunities in terms of missed investments and time taken to process credit due to 
lost documents among others (Calmeadow, 1996). Beck, et al. (2006) point out that some of the cost-related 
factors that may limit access to financial services include documentation requirements, transport costs, and fees. 
In an important survey conducted among relatively large commercial banks in several countries whose aim was 
to investigate price and non-price barriers with regard with credit, deposit, and payment services, the findings 
show that there are critical variations in parameters. Proximity of branches and other financial point of sale 
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facilities such as post office services or mobile outlets greatly reduce the cost of accessing financial services for 
clients. Proximity to the financial service provider also figures largely. In addition to proximity, the ability to be 
mobile allows greater access to financial services. According to Goldsmith (1969), many economists across the 
globe have now focused their attention on issues surrounding high interest on borrowing in a bid to stimulate 
borrowing which will in turn bring about economic growth. 
This section of the literature reveals that cost associated with accessing financial service is only not 
affected by direct factors such as interest rate, but also by social cultural networks, and economic, psychological, 
financial, regulation and compliance costs. The literature further establishes that a positive relationship exists 
between access to finance and the social and cultural network-related factors such as membership of a social 
network, while a negative relationship exists interest rate, regulatory and compliance costs and processing costs 
and economic cost such as opportunity cost of time (Beck, et al., 2006, Levine, 2004, Field et al., 2012). 
1.1.3 Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
The conceptual framework shown in Figure 1 below was developed out of a review of the existing 
literature on access to finance. It is adapted from Coetzee (2012), who argues that in assessing cost to client in 
relation to access or usage of financial services, there are many cost components to consider other than interest 
rates and fees. Coetzee (2012) stresses that there are demand-damping concerns with regard to access and usage 
of financial services by the low-income client in rural areas. These concerns largely consist of high costs 
incurred in accessing formal services. These costs do not merely involve recurrent transactions, costs and interest 
payments; rather, they also involve some hidden costs, as well as tangible costs such as economic costs, agency 
costs, social and cultural costs, psychological costs and regulatory and compliance costs. The study seeks to 
empirically identify and quantify overall cost-to-client components in accessing financial services (CGAP, 2012) 
1.14 Theoretical Framework 
The agency theory concept was coined as a result of lack of inadequacy of theory which could clearly and 
sufficiently explain agency relationships and property rights (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Stiglitz (1987 in 
Coetzee, 2004) explains that the principal-agent relationship emanates from the problem of uncertainty, 
asymmetry of information, moral hazard and adverse selection. The agency relationship exists when an 
individual who is the principal engages an agent to perform certain tasks on his/her behalf which involves the 
delegation of power. The principal who happens to be the employer or capital owner usually designs a contract 
or incentive scheme which motivates the employee (agent) to carry out stipulated duties (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). It is assumed that the agent may not always act in the interest of the principal as they must maximise 
utility which may diverge from the original contractual obligations. To counter this problem, the principal 
usually limits the agent’s divergence from the main objective by providing incentives for the agent and 
expending resources (monitoring costs) to check if the agent is sticking to the objectives and laid down 
procedure. The agent will expend resources which are known as bonding costs in the transaction. Residual loss 
occurs as it is impossible to ensure optimal decisions at zero cost to the principal and agent as they carry out their 
duties. In summary the agency costs are simply the bonding costs by the agent, monitoring costs by the principal, 
and the residual loss due to divergence between principal and agent decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Principal-agent relationships can be applicable to many situations, i.e. credit and insurance industries and many 
more (Coetzee, 2012). Therefore, in a normal situation, a financial institution lends out money to a client. Both 
the agent and the principal will expend some costs in processing of obtaining the loan and serving the client 
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respectively. The bonding costs may include the following financial costs such interest, loan fees, commissions, 
discounting fees, savings requirements and insurance payments requirements, whereas transaction fees include 
transportation costs involved in receiving and repaying the loan. Fees paid to acquire Know Your Customer 
(KYC) documents, costs of professional fees such as lawyers, and communication costs are among the main fees 
that compose transaction fees. The last category of cost as suggested by CGAP (2010) is opportunity costs, 
which include missed investments, forgone income and extra time spent processing the loan.  
 
2.0 Methodology  
This study was conducted in Chongwe District of Lusaka Province in Zambia, located about 45 kilometres east 
of the central business district of Lusaka city. The sample area covered six villages, which are the main 
operational areas for the financial service providers covered by the study. Data used in the study comprised both 
primary and secondary data. The primary data were collected using structured questionnaires from a cross-
section of randomly selected rural household heads that had access to and used financial services (credit), either 
formal or informal. Information gathered from the survey included data on socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics, agricultural activity, land tenure, social capital, asset ownership, financial psychological stress, 
financial charges, transport charges and income. To achieve consistency of answers, control questions were 
included in the questionnaire. In addition, the enumerators were carefully trained to use other questions in the 
collection tool to deal with cases of inconsistencies in responses.  
The study employed two different sample types. First, the study used purposive sampling which is a 
non-probability sample that conforms to certain criteria for selecting households. Purposive sampling was useful 
in this study as it helped to reach targeted samples. The study further used a quota sampling as a second type of 
purposive sampling. According to Cooper (1998), quota sampling is used to enhance the quality of the sample 
representativeness for sample variables in the population which the study had no control over. Quota sampling 
allowed me as a researcher to sample a subgroup that is of great interest to the study, as it aimed to investigate 
some characteristics of clients, both those with and without access to financial services. Secondly, the study 
employed random sampling in choosing households which do not access and use financial services and living in 
close proximity to households accessing and using financial services. To collect data from the non-access group 
(control group), the study employed random sampling to choose households without access to financial services, 
particularly those that resided in close proximity to the households with financial access. The main purpose for 
using a control group in this research was to eliminate and isolate all confounding variables and bias. For 
instance, in this study, the control group ensured that no confounding variables affected the results or factored in 
any likely sources of bias as it (control group) is expected to work in the modelling. 
2.1.1 Measurement: Analytical Techniques  
To effectively address the first two objectives of this study, the Heckman two-stage selection model was used. 
As mentioned above, it was stipulated that the client’s costs of accessing financial services is driven by utility 
maximisation under the agency costs theory. This is attributed to the fact that both the principal (financial service 
provider) and the agent’s (client) behaviour are driven by the need to maximise the utility associated accessing 
and provision of credit services (financial services). Depending on the clients’ perception of the utility they are 
likely to derive from the ability to access and use credit services (financial services), a decision is made, either to 
access or not. This client behaviour that leads to a discrete choice to be made is modelled in a logical sequence, 
starting with the decision to access credit services, and then followed by a decision on the cost channel to access 
to credit services (financial services). Knowing that client‘s utility maximisation behaviour cannot be observed, 
the choice made by the client to access to credit services (financial services) is assumed to represent their utility 
maximisation behaviour.Based on the nature of decisions described above, it is rightful and justifiable to use the 
Heckman two-stage selection model whose estimation involves two stages. In the first stage, the decision to 
access credit services (financial services or not was assessed using a probit model. The choice of this model is 
based on the fact that the decision to access credit services is discreet; it is either one has access or not. A key 
study assumption is that of a normal distribution and, therefore, the choice of the probit model. The probit model 
used in the first stage is as specified in Equation 1.3 
Heckman Two-Stage Equation 
The econometric model developed by Heckman, known as the Heckman two-stage equation, was adopted to 
identify the factors influencing costs to clients in accessing rural financial services in Zambia. Below is a 
mathematical expression of the Heckman two-stage model estimation; 
STAGE ONE: PROBIT MODEL 
Probit model analysis was employed to determine the status of access to financial services, based on cost-to-
client component attributes. The choice of this model is appropriate owing to the fact that access to financial 
services is a discreet value. This signifies that the household either has access to finance or not. The probit model 
is a probability model where the dependent variable (yi) can either be one or zero, while the continuous 
independent variables xi are estimated in the probit model are specified as;  
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YI
*
 = Xi’β + µi   µi~ N (0, σ²) i =1...n      (1) 
YI 
 
= YI
*
   if YI
*
 > 0 
YI = 0   otherwise 
The respondent either has access (YI = YI
*
) or does not (YI
*
 = 0) as a function of a set of factors xi (direct financial 
costs, economic costs, regulatory and compliance costs, social and cultural networks, psychological costs),  
where:  
Xi = are explanatory variables corresponding to the ith household’s cost-to-client attributes   
YI
 
= are observed cost-to-client attributes when there is access and use of a financial service by the ith 
household  
YI
*
 = is an unobserved continuous latent variable assumed to determine the value of the cost to client 
households 
β = vector of the coefficients of independent variables 
µi = the independent normally distributed error term (assumed to be normal with zero mean and 
variance 1). 
In the case of a model of access to financial services, the latent variable is only observed if the respondent has a 
formal credit account with any of the financial service providers of interest to the study.  
This stage uses the Heckman two-stage empirical model procedure. The above probit model can be equally 
expressed as below for computation purposes: 
Pr (ZI =1 |XI, β) =θ (Q (XI, β)) +εI         (2) 
or  
Prob (YI   = 1 |Xi   ) =  Xi’β)       (3) 
Where: 
YI
*
 = is an indicator variable equal to unity for households that have access to credit financial services 
 = the standard normal distribution function 
βs = the parameters to be estimated,  
Xs = the determinants of the choice.  
When the utility that household j derives from access to finance is greater than 0, Yi takes a value equal to 1 or 
otherwise 0. It follows therefore, that the equation is: 
YI
*   
+ Xi’β + VI           (4)  
where: 
YI
*
= is the latent level of utility the household gets from having access to financial services and VI ~
 
N (0, 
1). 
Based on this assumption, it then follows that: 
YI = 1 if Yi
* 
> 0    and    YI = 0 if Yi
* 
≤ 0       (5) 
Empirically, the model can be also represented in the equation below: 
YI = Xi’β +ɛi         (6) 
where: 
YI 
=
 is the probability of a household having access to financial services 
Xi = is a vector of explanatory variables corresponding to the ith household’s cost-to-client attributes 
ɛi = the error term. 
STAGE TWO: INVERSE MILLS RATIO 
In the second step, the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) ( ) was added as a regressor in the cost-to-client function 
regarding access to financial services, in order to correct for potential selection bias.  
          (7) 
where: 
 φ (.) = normal probability density function. 
First, the determinants of the cost-to-client attributes were estimated. Then the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) 
from the selected equation was employed as an independent variable in the target equation that will be used 
to estimate the cost to the client in accessing financial services, as shown in equation 4.7 (cost to client 
equation)  
E (ZI  |Y=1) = ʄ (Xi’β )+  γ  +µi         (8) 
Where: 
E = is the expectation operator, Y is the (continuous variable) of the cost to client in accessing financial 
services  
x = the vector of independent variables affecting the costs to client,  
β = the vector of the corresponding coefficients to be estimated. 
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 = the estimated Inverse Mill Ratio and  
µi~ N (0, σ²). 
Therefore, Zi can be expressed as in equation 9. 
Z
*
 I = Xi’β + γ  + µi          (9) 
This is only observed if a household has access to credit financial services (Y=1). 
Hence, empirically, Zi can be finally expressed as shown below: 
Z
*
 I = Xi’β + γ  + µi          (2.0) 
where:  
ZI = is the cost to client in accessing financial services  
Xi = the vector of independent variables affecting the cost to the client, 
 = the estimated IMR in the first stage of the Heckman model above and 
µi = error term.  
Equation (4) and (9) will be jointly estimated using the Heckman two-stage procedure in STAGE ONE.
Model adapted from Berem et al. (2011) 
 
3.0 Empirical Research 
Table 1: Average Socio-Economic and Demography Characteristics of Households 
Variables  All 
households  
(n = 236) 
Households with credit 
access (n = 118) 
Households without credit 
access (n = 118) 
t-test  
Education 8 (0.348) 10 (0.167) 6 (0.483) 0.82** 
Land ownership 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.043** 
Gender of 
household head 
0.45 (0.036) 0.62 (0.041) 0.65 (0.073) 0.31
NS
 
Age of household 
head 
43 (0.684) 44 (0.367) 56 (0.890) 4.1 
NS
 
Standard Error of the means are in parentheses **significant at 95 % level of confidence    
NS 
Not significant 
 
Household Socio—Economic and Demographic Characteristics  
Individuals’ participation in rural credit market is largely dependent on economic and demographic 
characteristics such as marital status, land ownership (title land), gender and educational attainment. These 
characteristics are important as the have a bearing on household’s demand for credit services, this is owing to the 
fact the assessment of client’s creditworthiness is based on such factors. Table 1 above presents household socio 
economic and demographic characteristics. The age of respondents ranged from 19 to 80 years with a mean of 
43.23 years and standard deviation of 12.41. The average age of individuals with no access to financial services 
was 44.36 years, while that of those with access was 42.81 years. Cultivated Land size (own and rented) of 
respondents households varied between 0.5 to 16 hectares with a mean holding of 4.23 hectares and a standard 
deviation of 2.6. Mean cultivated land size for individuals with no access to financial services was 4.35 hectares 
while it was 3.2 hectares for those with access to financial services. The standard deviation was 1.8 and 3.2 
respectively for the two groups. Years of schooling completed by the household head was used as measure of 
education level. The average years of schooling completed of the household heads was 6.04 years with a 
standard deviation of 4.64. Mean years of schooling for individuals with no access to financial services was 4.65 
years while it was 7.11 years for those with access to financial services. Results from Table 1 indicate that there 
is no significant between the gender of household head and age for households with access to credit services 
financial services and those without at 95 percent confidence level. However the results revealed that there was a 
significance at 95 percent confidence level of land ownership and education for households the results having 
access to credit financial services and those without. Results from the gender analysis imply that male-headed 
households have more access to credit than female-headed households due to their capacity for having more 
tangible collateral base than women. This age variance may be attributed to financial service provider most 
lending to economically active group as this group gets credit for productive purposes. The results show these 
access groups were actively involved in economic activities 
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Table 2: Step 2 Target Equation with Overall Cost to Client as Dependent Variable 
 
***, ** and * represent level of significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively 
Source: Survey data, 2013. 
All nine variables entered into the regression analysis were found to be statistically significant at less 
than 10 % level. These variables are interest rate (Ifeescharge), loan processing fees (LPF), opportunity cost of 
waiting for the loan (OPCWL), total regulatory and compliance costs (TRCcosts), opportunity cost of time 
(OPcosts), psychological financial stress (Psychp), efficiency in time to be served by financial provider 
(ETscosts), total direct fees (TDfeescosts), and social and cultural network (SCcosts). All variables had the 
expected sign as hypothesised in theory (Table 2), which is supported by economic theory. The model shows 
results of the effect of the cost-to-client construct as described in Figure 1 on the amount spent in accessing 
credit services (overall cost to client) from a financial institution. The results of the econometric analysis show 
that time taken (efficiency) to be served by financial provider (ETscosts), psychological financial stress 
(Psychp), interest fees charged by financial service provider on credit products (Ifees), loan processing fees 
(LPF), opportunity cost of time spent travelling (OPcosts), total direct fees (TDfeescosts), total regulatory and 
compliance costs (TRCcosts), and opportunity cost of waiting for the loan (OPWL), and social and cultural 
network membership (SCcosts) were all significant in influencing costs to the client. Among respondents, in 
terms of credit, Total Regulatory and Compliance Costs (TRCcosts) was found to influence the amount of cost to 
the client expended in accessing credit products positively and significantly (at 5 %). That is, clients who spent 
more money to meet their regulatory and compliance requirements incurred more costs in accessing credit 
products than those who spent less time, keeping the other factors constant, because every kwacha spent on 
“know your customer” (KYC) requirements increases the cost to the client by 1.24 kwacha. The effects of these 
significant variables on the dependent variable are discussed below. Every kwacha charged on loan processing 
by the financial providers leads to an increase in client’s costs to access credit services by 0.016 kwacha, ceteris 
paribus. This entails that each additional kwacha charged in loan processing increases the cost to the client, 
thereby reducing the accessibility of credit products positively and significantly at 5 % level. For each extra day 
spent by a client waiting for the loan approval, the client’s costs to access the credit product increase by 0.07 
Kwacha, ceteris paribus. This suggests that each additional day that passes raises the cost to the client, thereby 
reducing the accessibility of credit products. This variable was positive for households that belonged to social 
and cultural networks, which incurred less cost in accessing credit products. Households that belonged to social 
and cultural networks incurred less cost in accessing credit products. Holding all the other factors constant, 
membership of a social and cultural network decreases costs to the client by 0.368 Kwacha. This variable was 
negative and significant at 5 % in influencing the costs incurred by the clients to access credit products. A one 
percent increase in interest fees levied on credit accounts leads to an increase in client costs to access credit 
services by 0.87 kwacha, ceteris paribus. This entails that each additional increase percent in interest charged 
increases the cost to the client thereby reducing the accessibility of credit products and services as indicated in 
the table above 
3.1.1 Limitations  
One of the major limitations of the study is that the accuracy of the data collected depends solely on the 
information provided by the respondents. Most of the households lack records on access to financial access, 
hence the dependence of the research on verbal information from the selected respondents, who depend on 
recollection. Sample selection methods and procedures are explained earlier. Therefore, the existence of any bias 
on the part of the respondents could affect the results. However, appropriate scientific approaches were 
employed to ensure that confidence levels were high enough for statistical reliability. It is also worth noting that 
one of the limitations of the empirical analysis is the sensitivity of the topic at hand. Some respondents were 
reluctant to provide vital information in relation to the study.  
Variable Coefficient Z P > |Z| 
OPcosts 0.05 −0.61 0.08 * 
Ifees 0.87 −4.05 0.00*** 
TDfeescosts 3.03 3.27 0.01*** 
ETscosts 0.08 −5.43 0.02** 
SCcosts* −0.37 3.09 0.04** 
TRCcosts 1.24 −2.38 0.02** 
 (Psychp) −0.14 −0.84 0.04** 
LPF 0.02 −0.06 0.06 * 
OPCL 0.07 −2.66 0.09 * 
Mills Lambda 0.11 2.98 0.03** 
Lambda 0.07   
Rho 1.00   
Sigma 0.11   
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3.1.2 Implications 
The implications of the research findings, as highlighted above, indicate that financial costs, economic costs, 
regulatory and compliance costs, social and cultural costs and psychological cost characteristics all significantly 
influence costs to clients. However, for a deeper understanding of the cost-to-client construct, a holistic study of 
the environment should be conducted, as shown in the cost-to-client framework in Figure 1 above. Government 
and other stakeholders must work together to ensure that available financial services are appropriate and 
affordable for the rural market, both for individuals and enterprises. 
3.1.3 Future Research  
Lastly, an area of research not covered by this study, which is essential to better understand rural financial 
markets, is the analysis of the cost to serve incurred by the financial service providers in delivering the services 
to rural inhabitants 
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